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“When an industry has thus chosen a locality ... it is likely to stay there ... so great
are the advantages ... The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were
in the air,... inventions and improvements in machinery, in processes and the general
organization of the business have the merits promptly discussed; if one man starts a new
idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own...” (Marshall
(1890), IV,x,3)
1 Introduction
The international diffusion of ideas lies at the heart of economic growth and the im-
provement of the welfare of nations. Unlike most commodities, knowledge is hard to
appropriate by its inventors and “spills over” to other agents in the economy. Under-
standing how knowledge spreads is key to understanding a number of growth enhancing
policies (for example, to work out the optimal subsidy to R&D or the degree of intellec-
tual property protection). In this paper we revisit the question of whether geographic
proximity plays an important role in the spread of knowledge and in particular how this
has changed over time. In the popular imagination the notion of the “death of distance”
(Friedman, 2005, Cairncross, 1997; Coyle, 1997) expresses the idea that information now
travels around the globe at rapid speed. Under this view, ideas generated in California
spread to Calcutta or Coventry through the Internet, conferences, telephone and other
communication devices at an unprecedented rate, and geography plays little role.
There are several counter-arguments that suggest that geographical proximity con-
tinues to exert a strong influence over knowledge flows. Indeed, in the trade literature
there is little evidence that distance has become any less important for trade flows (e.g.
the meta-analysis of Disdier and Head, 2006 or Leamer, 2007), and some evidence that
its importance may have actually increased (e.g. Evans and Harrigan, 2005, and refer-
ences therein). Distance may still matter if face-to-face interaction is important even
in high tech sectors, because knowledge is tacit and hard to codify. Globalization may
also mean increasing specialization in the technologies where countries have comparative
advantage, implying that they have “less to learn” from one another. So ultimately this
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is an empirical question - do technology spillovers increase with geographic proximity
and has this changed over time?
Figure 1 presents some raw data that is consistent with the view that distance has
become less important over time for the international transmission of ideas (we will
discuss the data in much more detail later in the paper). We plot the relative speed of
patent citations over time. For example, in the top left panel we look at all successful
applications to the US Patent Office for inventors living in Germany in an “early”
period (1975-1989) on the left and then in a “later” period (1990-1999) on the right.
Looking first at the early period, the height of each bar indicates how much slower
foreign inventors were in being first to cite German inventors relative to other German
inventors. So American inventors were about 14% slower in citing Germans patents than
Germans themselves and the French were about 4% slower. The fact that the bars are
almost all positive suggests the well-known phenomenon of home bias in ideas - Germans
are quicker at citing other Germans, British quicker at citing other British, etc. What
is more interesting about Figure 1 is how home bias has changed over time. On average
the bars in the later period are lower than the bars in the earlier period, suggesting that
home bias in ideas has fallen, consistent with some “death of distance” ideas. In the post
1990 period, Americans are only about 5% slower in citing Germans and the French are
only about 1% slower in citing Germans, than the Germans themselves. Table 1 holds
the underlying data: the average time to the first citation in the early period from a
German inventor to another German inventor was 1,559 days compared to 1,770 days
for an American inventor. This shows that home bias exists. The speed of transmission
within Germany increased over time - in the later period the average time to first citation
was only 966 days. But the fall was even greater elsewhere: the time to first American
citation fell to 1,016 (a fall of 754 days compared to a fall of 593 days for a German to
German first citation).
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Looking across Figure 1 as a whole, the pattern is repeated in most regions - foreigners
became relatively much quicker at citing domestic patents after 1990.1 There are, of
course, many reasons why the simple patterns in the raw data might be misleading,
and much of this paper is devoted to developing and implementing the appropriate
econometric tools to show that the results in the raw data are essentially robust to
controlling for confounding factors such as unobserved fixed effects and censoring.
In terms of related literature, it is well known that tracking international knowledge
spillovers is a difficult task. One branch of the literature tries to identify the transfer
of technology indirectly by examining changing rates of total factor productivity (TFP)
growth across countries and assuming that the faster productivity growth rates of (some)
countries or industries that lie further behind the frontier is due to the transfer of ideas.2
While attractive, a drawback of this approach is that it only provides indirect evidence,
the positive correlation between productivity growth and the lagged productivity gap
could represent many statistical and economic mechanisms that have nothing to do with
the spread of ideas.
A second branch of the literature takes a production function and includes the R&D
of other countries as an additional variable. These papers tend to find that the R&D of
other countries is valuable, but usually not as valuable as R&D in domestic economy.3
This approach has the advantage of using a direct measure of technology. But it shares
two general problems of the R&D spillover literature. First, it is necessary to identify the
1There are other interesting features in Figure 1 over and above the general fall in home bias. First,
Japanese inventors appear particularly quick at citing other countries’ inventors and this has grown
stronger over time. Second, although home bias has fallen for the US with respect to the Rest of World,
it appears to have increased with respect to the main EU countries (Germany, France and Britain). As
we will see in the econometric section, once we control for other factors, there is not much evidence for
home bias of US inventions in the later period.
2For example see Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2004).
3Note that the production function is augmented to control for the firm’s own R&D. For an intro-
duction to spillovers in general see Griliches (1992). At the cross country level see Coe and Helpman
(1995) and Keller (1998). At the industry level see Bernstein and Mohnen (1998). The best work is at
the firm level which finds evidence that countries’ behind the frontier benefit much more from frontier
R&D than vice versa. See Bransetter (2001), Bransetter and Sakibora (2002) and Griffith, Harrison
and Van Reenen (2006).
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relevant external pool of information (i.e. to find a way to appropriately weight the R&D
of other countries by order of importance) and second, the correlation of productivity
with R&D is still a very indirect measure of the spillover itself.
A third branch is based around using patent citation information as a direct measure
of the transfer of knowledge. The citation of one patent by another strongly suggests that
the first patent contained useful knowledge which helped the second innovation. A classic
paper in this field is Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993), which uses a matching
methodology to show that inventors were far more likely to cite other inventors living
in geographic proximity (e.g. the same state or country) when compared to inventors in
other states or countries. Several papers have followed this approach, and a consensus
has emerged that knowledge is subject to a significant degree of “home bias”. As with
the R&D-production function, distance appears to matter4.
In this paper we also use citations to proxy knowledge spillovers but take a somewhat
different approach. We consider the speed with which a patent is cited, and propose
a duration modelling framework that explicitly deals with the problem of unobserved
patent characteristics that may be correlated with location or other characteristics. To
see how fixed effects could generate a bias consider the case of two countries (e.g. the
US and Japan) and assume that higher quality patents will be cited more quickly than
lower quality patents. If US inventors produce, on average, higher quality patents and US
inventors are more nimble at using the ideas of other countries we will observe that US
based inventors tend to cite other US inventors more than they cite Japanese inventors.
This will give the impression of “home bias” whereas in fact it is to do with the higher
average quality of US inventors in the generation of new knowledge (and absorption of
older knowledge). Controlling for fixed effects will therefore reduce the degree of “home
4For example, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1999) found that inventors in one country were far more likely
to cite inventors living in the same country than in other countries, although this difference tended
to diminish over time. Thompson and Fox-Kean (2005) argue that using more disaggregated patent
classes drives away localization effects within the US, but they still observe home bias between the US
and other countries.See also Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) for a rejoinder.
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bias” observed in naive estimators.
Now consider a second scenario where inventions in Japan remain of lower quality
on average than in the US, but Japanese inventors are faster at absorbing old knowledge
than their US counterparts. This will make it appear that Japanese inventors cite US
inventors a lot and could disguise the existence of home bias. In this case, controlling
for fixed effects will remove the bias and increase the degree of home bias observed
in non-fixed effects estimators. In conclusion, the fixed effects bias could go in either
direction, but certainly could be important.
Using a duration model without fixed effects we find evidence of large home bias,
in line with the current literature. But, we find that home bias is partly a statistical
artefact of the failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. differences in patent
quality). This heterogeneity has been found to be an important feature of patent values
(e.g. Pakes, 1986). In the more “modern” technological sectors (such as the ICT, Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies sector and the Pharmaceutical sector), where
communication costs are likely to be relatively low, we find no systematic evidence for
home bias. In the more “traditional” sectors (such as Chemicals and Mechanical Engi-
neering), however, we do find evidence for systematic home bias, even after controlling
for fixed effects. Our most important finding is that even after controlling for fixed
effects, other covariates and censoring inter-country home bias appears to have fallen
over time. This is consistent with the raw data shown in Figure 1 and Table 1. The
only other econometric evidence that we are aware of that shows that geography mat-
ters less over time is the lower apparent degree of spillovers within elite US university
departments (Kim, Morse and Zingales, 2006)5. By contrast, our work covers the entire
economy.
5A recent paper by Head, Mayer and Ries (2007) estimates a gravity model of trade for services.
As with goods, they find no evidence of distance mattering less for services as a whole.However for one
important sub-sector, “miscellaneous business services”, distance does appear to matter less in 2004
than in 1992.
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The paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 sketches our econometric model. Section
3 details the data and Section 4 gives the results. Some concluding comments are in
Section 5.
2 Econometric Modelling Strategy
Our approach to estimate the impact of home bias on knowledge spillovers is based on
a multiple-spell duration model. Consider a patent that is taken out (the cited patent)
and the patents that subsequently cite it (the citing patents) - if geography is important
for the flow of information then we should expect to see that durations are shorter when
the citing inventor is located near the cited inventor. We focus on the first few citations.
Geography matters because most of the knowledge in a new invention is tacit, whereas
over time this information becomes codified. Consequently, over time information about
the invention is more easily transmitted across distances, and researchers with direct
knowledge of the invention become more geographically disperse.
As highlighted above, unobserved heterogeneity could confound our estimates as
higher quality patents may be cited more quickly. To control for this we use an estimator
that is analogous to the linear difference estimator by comparing the first and second
citations for each cited patent. By comparing the difference between the citing patents
we are able to “difference out” the unobserved characteristics of the cited patent.6
Let subscript i index cited patents and subscript j citing patents. Under this con-
vention, let Y˜ij denote the j-th citation duration for the i-th patent, that is the number
of days from the date when the i-th cited patent is granted to the date when the j-th
citing patent is granted, where i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , J . Here n is the the num-
ber of patents and J is the number of (potential) citations for each cited patent. Also,
let Xij denote the attributes of the j-th citing patent for the i-th cited patent and Ui
6See, for example, Chamberlain (1985), Ridder and Tunalı (1999), Horowitz and Lee (2004), and
Lee (2007).
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denote unobserved characteristics of the cited patent. For example, Ui may represent
unobserved quality of the cited patent.
We consider a multiple-spell version of the mixed proportional hazards model. The
hazard that Y˜ij = y˜ij conditional on Xij = xij and Ui = ui has the form
λi(y˜ij) exp(x
′
ijβ + ui), (1)
where β is a vector of unknown parameters and λi(·) is a cited-patent specific baseline
hazard function.
The citation durations Y˜ij are assumed to be independent of each other, conditional
on the observed and unobserved characteristics (Xij, Ui). In addition, the observed
covariates Xij are assumed to be constant within each spell but to vary over spells. For
example, Xij may include the location of the inventor of the j-th citing patent for the i-
th cited patent. We allow Ui to be arbitrarily correlated with Xij and do not impose any
distributional assumptions on Ui, and therefore, Ui is a fixed effect. The multiple-spell
structure allows Ui to have a very general form, compared to unobserved heterogeneity
in the single-spell duration models. The functional form of the baseline hazard function
λi(·) is unspecified and it can also vary across different cited patents. Therefore, the
model also allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the shape of the hazard function.
Under the conditional independence assumption, such that Y˜ij are independent of
each other conditional on (Xij, Ui), we can estimate β using a conditional likelihood
approach (e.g. Ridder and Tunali,1999). The idea behind the conditional likelihood
approach is as follows. Assume that there are only two potential citing patents (J = 2)
and let (1) denote a random variable that indicates which of the two citation durations
is first. The probability that the observed first citation duration is first, conditional on
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the duration of the first citation, is given by
Pr[(1) = 1|Y˜i(1) = y˜i1, Xi1 = xi1, Xi2 = xi2, Ui = ui]
=
λi(y˜i1) exp(x
′
i1β + ui)
λi(y˜i1) exp(x′i1β + ui) + λi(y˜i1) exp(x
′
i2β + ui)
=
exp(x′i1β)
exp(x′i1β) + exp(x
′
i2β)
, (2)
which does not depend on ui or λi. Therefore, β can be estimated based on this condi-
tional likelihood without the ‘incidental parameters’ problem.
A usual problem with analyzing such data is censoring. Given any dataset there
will be some patents that have not (yet) been cited, but which could in future be
cited. The standard conditional likelihood approach (see, e.g. Chamberlain, 1985)
can handle censoring if one always observes covariates Xij. In our application, like
many others, Xij are only observed when durations are uncensored. For example, we
can identify the location of the inventor of a citing patent only in the case when it is
observed. This problem forces us to use only uncensored spells and this may introduce a
selection problem. In our data, citation durations are obtained by looking at all recorded
citations at a particular date (December 31st 1999). We therefore treat the censoring as
independent of citation durations and covariates, and then weight the observations by the
inverse of the propensity to observe complete spells. This is analogous to the way that
missing data are treated in inverse probability weighted estimation (e.g. Wooldridge,
2007). See the Appendix for details of our estimation method.
There are two main differences between our approach and the more usual Jaffe and
Trajtenberg (1999) approach. First, we control for unobserved heterogeneity in a way
that they cannot. Second, we use only a sub-sample of the data that they use (two or
more cites instead of all cites). We do not attempt to characterize the entire shape of the
citation function, but rather focus on the first few cites. We believe that this is a natural
approach to examining international spillovers, as localization effects should be strongest
soon after a patent is granted when knowledge is still mostly tacit. Nevertheless, we see
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this approach as a complement rather than a substitute for the Jaffe and Trajtenberg
(1999) model.7
3 Data
To implement this estimator we use data from the NBER US Patent Citations Data
File.8 These data include information on all patents taken out at the United States
Patent Office (USPTO) and have been widely used in the economic analysis of spillovers.
Table 2 shows the sample sizes for our analysis. The NBER data consist of patents
granted and citations made to these patents between 1975 and 1999. In total we use
data on over 2.1 million cited patents. While these patents were all taken out in the
USPTO, the assignees and inventors can be located anywhere in the world. We use
the information on the inventors’ addresses to identify the location of the patent.9 We
focus on inventors located in the G5 countries - US, Japan, France, Germany and Great
Britain. We group the remaining EU countries together,10 and then consider the Rest
of the World (“RW”) as the residual category. Unsurprisingly, the US is the leading
country with nearly 1.2 million patents, and Japan is second with nearly 400,000. We
split our sample into two sub-periods, 1975-1989 and 1990-1999, and consider whether
the evidence for home bias differs over these two periods.
Crucially for our purposes, the NBER data contain information on all subsequent
citations to each patent made by other patents. In our baseline results, we use the infor-
mation contained in the first and second citations to implement the estimator described
in the previous section. As highlighted above, an issue that arises with using citation
7See Belenzon and Van Reenen (2007) for evidence on the changing time patterns of citations using
an approach closer to Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1999).
8See Jaffe (1986), Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001), Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) and Hall, Jaffe
and Trajtenberg (2005).
9Where there is more than one inventor we follow Jaffe et al (1993) and allocate patents to the
country where the majority of inventors are located. In the case of ties we randomly choose one of the
countries.
10These are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
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data is the problem that for some patents (those taken out near the end of the period)
these citations will be censored - that is the first or second citation will not have occurred
yet. This is a well documented problem with using citation data11. For example, in our
data (see Table 3), for 26% of patents in the chemicals technology sector we never see
a citation, for 15% we see only one citation, and for the remaining 59% we see two or
more citations. Similar patterns are observed for other technology sectors. Because of
this it is important that our empirical methods correct for censoring biases.
We control for whether or not the citation is a self-citation (i.e. whether the assignee
is the same on the cited and citing patent) and whether or not the cited and citing
patent are in the same technology class. We also control for the size of the base of po-
tential citing patents, that is the number of patents in the citing country and technology
sub-category. Table 3 reports some summary statistics for these control variables by
technology category. In Chemicals, 24% of all first citations are self-citations, and this
falls to 20% for the second citation. On average across technology sectors about 20%
are self citations and this declines by 2-4% from the first citation to the second citation.
More than 60% of citations are from the same technology class, and the average num-
ber of patents in the citing country and technology sub-category varies from 24,300 to
49,600. The proportions of self-citations, same technology class and the averages of the
bases (potential cites) are characteristics of citing patents and thus they are obtained
from only complete citation spells.
4 Results
4.1 Basic Results
We implement the estimator described above on all patents granted by the USPTO be-
tween 1975 and 1999. We report results across the seven cited regions and six technology
11For example, Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, (2001) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2002)
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categories, and allow all the coefficients to vary across these groups.
4.1.1 An example - Mechanical Engineering
We begin by going through the results for one technology category in one country to
illustrate our methodology. In Table 4 we show the coefficient estimates for the citing
country dummies when we look at Mechanical Engineering in Great Britain. Each
column in Table 4 reports the results from a different regression. The omitted category
is the own country - the location of the cited patent - which in this case is Great Britain
(GB). There are potentially 13,951 cited patents in Mechanical Engineering in Great
Britain over this time period, and from these 8,482 patents are cited at least twice.
Also included in the regression is an indicator of whether the citation is a self-citation,
whether the cited and citing patent are in the same technology class (three digit), and
the total number of citing patents in that country and technology class.
In column (1) of Table 4 we estimate the coefficients using a proportional hazard
model with only the first citation duration. This is equivalent to our model without
fixed effects (and constraining the baseline hazard to be the same across patents), i.e.
compared to equation (1) we assume,
λ(y˜ij) exp(x
′
ijβ). (3)
To keep the sample the same as when estimating the fixed effects model we restrict
the estimation to patents with at least two citations. The coefficients on the country
dummies indicate whether inventors located in that country cite British inventors in
mechanical engineering faster (a positive coefficient) or slower (a negative coefficient)
than inventors from the omitted category (which is always the own country, in this
case Great Britain). If there is home bias we expect negative coefficients on the other
country dummies, i.e. they are slower to cite than home inventors. In column (1) we
see negative and significant coefficients on all country dummies; these suggest strong
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support for home bias. Japanese inventors are the swiftest foreign group to cite British
inventors - they are only 13% slower than British inventors themselves. By contrast
inventors in the US are 31% slower to cite British patents.
In column (2) of Table 4 we control for unobserved cited patent characteristics (e.g.
quality) which may be correlated with the speed with which the patent is cited, by
estimating the coefficients using the fixed effect estimator with the first two citation
durations (without correcting for censoring).12 When fixed effects are included most
coefficients become closer to zero and the French and EU dummies become statistically
insignificantly different from zero. On average, this suggests that failure to control for
unobserved heterogeneity increases the degree of home bias. Note, however, that the
coefficient on Japan becomes larger in absolute magnitude, suggesting that the fixed
effects bias for Japan was to reduce the degree of home bias. This reinforces the point
that the direction of bias from failure to control for fixed effects cannot be signed a priori.
The simple fixed effects estimator in column (2) ignores the problem of censoring. In
column (3) we also allow for censoring, which raises the absolute magnitude of most
of the coefficients (and increases the standard errors), but has relatively little effect on
the qualitative findings. As would be expected, if the patent is taken out by the same
assignee (a self-citation) the citation speed is significantly faster (about 27% faster than
non self-citations in column (3)). Similarly, patents in the same technology class cite
each other significantly faster (12% faster than patents in different technology classes
according to column (3)).
We continue to illustrate the method by looking across all countries but still restrict-
ing ourselves to patents in the Mechanical Engineering category. In Table 5 each row
contains parameter estimates from a separate multiple spell duration model for each
country. For example, the third row shows the results from column (3) of Table 4 (the
12Specifically, the estimator maximizes the likelihood equation (A1) in the Appendix without the
correction term Gn(max[Yi1, Yi2]).
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coefficients on self-citation, technology class and base are not reported). Table 5 shows
only the results for the fixed effects and censoring model (denoted “FE + C”), i.e. the
model shown in column (3) of Table 4.
What do the coefficients in Table 5 tell us? As before, the omitted base category is
always the home country, and negative coefficients suggest home bias. Looking across
the second row for France, we see that all countries are slower to cite French inventors
than the French themselves: the coefficients for German and British inventors are only
weakly significant, other European inventors are 23% slower to cite French inventors,
Japanese are 19% slower, the Americans 32% slower and the rest of the world 52% slower.
So, just as in the British case, we see substantial evidence of apparent home bias. Note
that all regressions include unreported controls for whether the citation is a self citation,
whether it is in the same technology sub-category (three digit) and the total number of
citing patents in that country and technology class (“base”). Most of these controls are
highly significant and would lead to the impression of even more substantial home bias
if omitted.
We give a graphical representation of the results from Table 5 in Figure 2 to make
it easier to eyeball the results. Each cell corresponds to the equivalent cell in Table 5.
A circle represents a negative coefficient (home bias) and a cross represents a positive
coefficient. The size of the circle or the cross corresponds to the level of statistical
significance of a one-sided test for the null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient
is zero. A large circle represents significance at the 1% level, a medium circle significance
at the 5% level, a small circle significance at the 10% level, and a tiny circle insignificance
at the 10% level. The same ordering applies to crosses. The leading diagonal corresponds
to the omitted variable in each regression and therefore no coefficient is estimated or
displayed.13 So it is possible to immediately detect the degree of home bias for a country
by looking at the number and size of circles across a row. Britain, for example, has a full
13A full set of results are available on request from the authors.
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row of large circles indicating significant home bias, whereas the United States does not
(consistent with the raw data from all sectors in Figure 1). It is also clear from Figure
2 that there is less home bias among the EU countries (points in the top-left quadrant
marked with the dashed line box), compared to between the non-EU countries and EU
countries - the top right quadrant contains many rejections suggesting that Japan, the US
and other countries are much slower in citing European patents than their own inventors.
Furthermore, it can be seen that there exists an interesting asymmetry between the
European block and the Japan/US block, in the sense that European inventors are
quick to cite Japanese and American patents but Japan/US-located inventors are slow
to cite European patents.
Note that here, and in a few other cases, we obtain positive and significant coefficients
on US-cited patents. These suggest that, for example, French (FR) and British (GB)
inventors are quicker to cite US patents than are US inventors themselves. This may
reflect the fact that the patents we are focusing on are patents taken out in the US
patent office, suggesting that there will be a bias of all countries towards citing American
inventors.
4.1.2 Main Results
We conduct the equivalent analysis across all seven regions and six sectors. Table 6
summarizes the results (full results available on request). The number of rejections of
one-sided t-tests for the coefficients on country dummies are shown for each sector. Test
results are shown for three levels (1%, 5%, and 10%) using the no fixed effect hazard
model estimator (“No FE”), the fixed effect estimator (“FE”), and the censored fixed
effect estimator (“FE+C”).
The first striking result in Table 6 is that there appears to be strong evidence for
home bias when we consider the model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity
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(columns (1)-(3)). Of the 252 tests14 for no home bias, we reject at the 5% level in more
than 8 out of 10 cases (81%). This is consistent with evidence from the analysis of
citations data in other econometric studies (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999; Jaffe et al,
2005; Thompson and Fox-Kean, 2005). However, the picture changes when we control
for unobserved heterogeneity (columns (4) through (6)). Comparing column (5) to
column (2), for example, the rejection rate (the proportion of possible rejections that
are in fact rejected) falls from 81% to 36%. In other words, there are far fewer rejections
of home bias once we control for unobserved heterogeneity. Controlling for censoring
makes relatively little difference to the total number of rejects in columns (7) through
(9), the rejection rate is the same in column (8), where we control for censoring, as in
column (5), where we do not, although it does affect some of the individual results.
The impact of controlling for unobserved cited patent effects can also be seen graphi-
cally in Figure 3. For each sector, the left hand side diagrams shows the pattern without
controlling for fixed effects (no FE), whereas the right hand side presents results from
our preferred specifications with controls for fixed effects and censoring (FE + C). It
is clear that the proportion of large circles (evidence of significantly slower citations by
another country) falls dramatically when moving from the no-fixed-effects specifications
to the preferred specifications.
A second feature of Table 6 and Figure 3 is that there is a distinct pattern across
technology sectors in terms of home bias. In particular, there is less evidence of home
bias for the “modern” sectors of “Drugs and Medical”, “Electrical and Electronic”, and
“Computers and Communications” (ICT) once we control for unobserved heterogeneity
- i.e. we see few rejections of home bias in columns (4)-(9) in Table 6.15 Whereas
we reject home bias for the “more traditional” sectors of Mechanical Engineering and
Chemicals more often in Table 6. This is consistent with the idea that knowledge spreads
14Seven country regressions and six country dummies for each regression gives 42 tests for each sector.
15For example, in column (5) there are eight rejections in computers and eleven rejections in drugs.
By comparison there were twenty rejections in chemicals and eighteen in mechanical.
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much more quickly in the high tech, modern sectors of Computers and Communications
and Drugs & Medicines than in the older sectors. It is also congruent with Peri (2004)
who finds that knowledge spreads much more quickly across regional boundaries in the
computer and communication sector.
A third feature of Figure 3 is that the Rest of World (mainly non-OECD countries)
are much slower in citing the patents of the OECD countries. This suggests that non-
OECD countries are more “cut-off” from international pools of knowledge, either by dint
of their distance, infrastructure or development levels.
4.2 Falling home bias over time?
We now turn to the important issue of whether home bias has fallen over time, as some
commentators have suggested (e.g. due to the falling costs of international communi-
cation and/or travel). We divide our sample into an “early” period (1975-1989) and
a “late” period (1990-1999) where there are a similar absolute number of citations in
each period (see Table 2). We re-estimate all of our models on these two sub-periods
separately. We report a summary of these results in Tables 7 and 8 and Figure 4.16 It
is particularly important to control for censoring in this comparison, as the results from
the second period will be much more affected by censoring than the former period.
We start in Table 7 by reporting results using the no fixed effect hazard model
estimator. In columns (1) and (2) we see that there is a large decline in rejection rates
across all technology sectors over time. No home bias is rejected in 70% of cases in
the early period, but only for 38% of cases in the later period (in the table we report
results at the 5% significance level). In columns (3) and (4) we repeat the exercise, but
focus on OECD countries (i.e. we report the number of rejections for country dummy
coefficients dropping the “Rest of the World” coefficients and also dropping coefficients
from the “Rest of the World” cited patent regressions). There is substantial home bias
16The full results of these estimations are available on request from the authors.
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for the non-OECD countries, as noted above, so we wanted to check that the time series
changes are not being driven by them alone. It is clear that the main patterns of results
stand up. Although the absolute level of home bias is lower, the fall in the degree of
home bias in the traditional sectors remains dramatic. On average the rejection rate falls
from 66% to 33%, but the fall is particularly strong in Chemicals (from 21 rejections in
the early period to only 6 in the late period). The final two columns look within the
European countries (counting rejections only on European country dummy coefficients of
European-country-cited-patent regressions). The patterns are similar, with large decline
in home bias.
As we saw above, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is important. In Table
8 we find that in both periods, the level of home bias is lower when we control for
fixed effects (and censoring), but the trend reduction in home bias over time is just as
apparent in the fixed effects models as it was in the no fixed effects models of Table 7.
Looking at the first two columns of Table 8 there is a fairly clear pattern. For the three
“traditional” sectors (Chemicals, Mechanical Engineering and Others) it appears that
home bias has fallen substantially. For Chemicals the number of rejections fell from 16
in the early period (pre 1989) to 8 in the 1990s (i.e. the rejection rate fell from 38%
to 19%). For Mechanical Engineering the fall was from 20 (48%) to 6 (14%) and for
the other industries it fell from 20 (48%) to 11 (26%). These are substantial declines,
suggesting a big fall in home bias over time for the traditional sectors. By contrast,
the “modern” sectors have seen little change, mainly because they had much less home
bias to begin with. We actually see an increase in the number of rejections from 2 to
5 in Computers & Communications and a constant number of 8 in Drugs & Medicines.
These are the two sectors where there has been the most discussion of “clustering” (e.g.
ICT in Silicon Valley and biotechnology in Cambridge, Massachusetts)17 so it may be
unsurprising that the forces of agglomeration remain unchanged in these sectors. On
17For example see Zucker, Darby and Brewer (1998) on biotechnology.
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the other hand, it is worth noting that there was very little evidence of home bias once
we have controlled properly for unobserved heterogeneity, so that the absolute number
of rejections is still very low, even in the late period. These results are also shown in
Figure 4, where the left hand side diagrams are of the early period and the right hand
side diagrams are of the late period: the later period has far fewer “circles” (evidence
for home bias) than the earlier period.
The obvious conclusion is that home bias has fallen, and it has fallen in those sectors
where one would a priori expect it to fall. This appears to be the first concrete quan-
titative evidence for an aspect of globalization that is much discussed but never proven
- the increasing propensity of knowledge to slip over geographic boundaries. It is con-
sistent with recent evidence from Kim, Morse and Zingales (2006) that the “spillover”
benefits that academics obtain from their colleagues within the same university are less
important now than they were two decades ago.
4.3 Robustness of results
Could there be reasons why the apparent decline in home bias is spurious? Firstly, a
concern may be that the number of rejections of home bias has fallen because the number
of observations is lower in the late period. But Table 2 shows that if anything the number
of patents is slightly higher in the later period, so this cannot be the reason. Secondly,
could it be that the differential quality of patents has caused this to occur? For example,
a lot of the decline in Figure 4 is because the US, Japan and the Rest of the World are
citing European patents more quickly (relative to their own patents). This can be seen
from the decline in large circles in the upper right hand quadrants of the “traditional
industries”. But this ignores the fact that there has been some decline in home bias
within European countries. More importantly, our technique of using multiple cites to
“difference out” the fixed effect means that we have controlled for cited patent quality.
Consequently, differential quality cannot be the reason for the patterns we observe in
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Table 8 (but it might be the reason for the patterns observed in Table 7 which does not
control for fixed effects). Thirdly, we also tried using different cut-off years and found
that this lead to similar results. For example, we obtain qualitatively similar results
using 1985 as a cut-off year. For example, in chemicals the number of rejections using
all countries decreases from 21 in the pre-1985 period to 10 in the post-1985 period. For
mechanical engineering the fall was from 16 to 9.18
We have used only the first two citations to measure home bias. Why not use the
third, fourth, fifth, etc. citation? Our main reason is because we believe that the
theoretically relevant information is contained in the first few citations. This is before
the patent has become more general public knowledge, it is when information is the
most tacit. After the patent has been published and cited it becomes codified, and there
is less reason to believe that geography should matter. So the first few citations are
exactly what we are interested in. In addition, we have argued for a smaller number of
citations on grounds of theory (the first few cites are likely to be where home bias is
greatest due to tacitness of knowledge) and parsimony (we need at least two observations
to “difference out” the fixed effect, so the first two citations is the minimum number).
Nevertheless, to tackle this issue directly we also checked the robustness of our results
to including the third and fourth cites. The conditional likelihood estimator developed
in Section 2 can easily be extended for more than two citations. Suppose that J = 3,
i.e. that there are three potential citing patents. Then it is straightforward to show that
the probability that the observed second citation is second, conditional on the durations
of the first and second citations, has the logit form as in equation (1), independent of
unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, this implies that one can obtain another censored fixed
estimator exactly the same way as in equation (2) by replacing the subscripts 1 and 2
with subscript 2 and 3, respectively.19
18As before, the “modern” sectors have seen an increase in the number of rejections from 7 to 11 in
pharmaceuticals and from 5 to 9 in electrical and electronic.
19Similarly, if J = 4, one can show that the probability that the observed third citation is third,
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Our qualitative findings did not change. For example, in Table 6, for the 5% level,
the number of rejections falls from 203 to 94 as we control for unobserved heterogeneity
of citing patents. When we use the second and third citations, for the same level, the
number of rejections changes from 202 to 87; when we use the third and fourth citations,
the number falls from 192 to 42. The larger decline with the third and fourth citations
is consistent with our conjecture that geography is less important as the patent becomes
more general public knowledge.
5 Conclusions
Patent citations have become an important source of information about the ways in
which knowledge flows between firms and countries. But knowledge can spread more or
less quickly due to the unobservable characteristics of patents, which may be poorly cap-
tured by observable characteristics. In this paper we propose an econometric technique
for dealing with fixed effects in duration models that exploits the existence of multiple
citations on the same patent, and implements this estimator on a database of over two
million citations between 1975 and 1999. We have focused on the speed of knowledge
flows between countries, which is a key feature of models of growth and international
trade. Many papers have argued that there is substantial “home bias” in the way that
knowledge is transmitted, in the sense that being geographically close makes knowl-
edge transfers easier, and this has become accepted wisdom in government support for
“clusters” and other forms of technology policy.
We find that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity makes a large quantitative and
qualitative difference to estimates of home bias in innovative activity. First, the evidence
for home bias is much weaker once we control for fixed effects (and censoring). The non-
fixed effects models (which are standard in the literature) suggest home bias in a majority
conditional on the durations of the first, second and third citations has the logit form again, independent
of unobserved heterogeneity. Then one can obtain yet another censored fixed estimator exactly the same
way as in equation (2) by replacing the subscripts 1 and 2 with subscript 3 and 4, respectively.
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of cases, whereas our preferred models indicate home bias in only a minority of cases.
Second, home bias is much stronger in the “traditional sectors” (such as chemicals and
mechanical engineering) than in more “modern” sectors (such as computing), consistent
with the idea that information diffuses faster internationally in these sectors. Finally,
and perhaps most provocatively, we find evidence that home bias has declined over time,
being much stronger in the pre-1990 period than the post-1990 period. We interpret this
as suggesting that information flows more easily across national boundaries as the cost
of international communication and travel has fallen.
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Figure 1: Time to first citation, by cited and citing inventor location
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Notes: This graph shows the relative time (in mean number of day) from the date that a Germany inventor was granted a patent until the first citation of that patent, 
by the location of the inventor that made the first citation. For example, the first bar (diagonal bricks) for France in the early period indicates that when the first 
citation to a Germany patent was made by a French inventor this citation took on average 4% longer than when the first citation was made by a Germany inventor 
(i.e. the mean citation length to a German inventor was 1559 days compared to 1623 days (1623=1599*1.04) to a French inventor). 
Table 1 shows the raw numbers for all cells.
Figure 2: Graphical Representation of Estimation Results
Notes: Each cell in Figure 2 corresponds to the equivalent cell in Table 4. A circle represents a
negative coefficient (home bias) and a cross represents a positive coefficient. The size of the circle or
the cross corresponds to the level of statistical significance of a one-side test for the null hypothesis
that the corresponding coefficient is zero. A large circle represents significance at the 1% level, a
medium circle significance at the 5% level, a small circle significance at the 10% level, and a tiny
circle insignificance at the 10% level. The same ordering applies to crosses. The leading diagonal
corresponds to the omitted variable in each regression and therefore no coefficient is estimated. The
upper left quadrant with dashed lines contains the cross-citations from the European Countries.
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Figure 3: No Fixed Effects (“No FE”) and Fixed Effects with Censoring (“FE+C”)
Panel A: No Fixed Effects Panel B: Censored Fixed Effects
Notes: For each sector, the left-hand side diagram shows the pattern without controlling for fixed
effects whereas the right-hand side presents results from our preferred specifications with controls for
fixed effects and censoring. The upper left quadrant with dashed lines contains the cross-citations
from the European Countries.
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Figure 3: No Fixed Effects (“No FE”) and Fixed Effects with Censoring (“FE+C”) (Continued)
Panel A: No Fixed Effects Panel B: Censored Fixed Effects
Notes: For each sector, the left-hand side diagram shows the pattern without controlling for fixed
effects whereas the right-hand side presents results from our preferred specifications with controls for
fixed effects and censoring. The upper left quadrant with dashed lines contains the cross-citations
from the European Countries.
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Figure 4: Early Period vs. Late Period
Panel A: Early Period (1975-1989) Panel B: Late Period (1990-1999)
Notes: The left-hand side diagrams are estimation results for the early period (1975-1989) and
the right hand side diagrams are for the late period (1990-1999). Estimation results are from our
preferred fixed effects plus censoring specifications. The upper left quadrant with dashed lines
contains the cross-citations from the European Countries.
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Figure 4: Early Period vs. Late Period (Continued)
Panel A: Early Period (1975-1989) Panel B: Late Period (1990-1999)
Notes: The left-hand side diagrams are estimation results for the early period (1975-1989) and
the right hand side diagrams are for the late period (1990-1999). Estimation results are from our
preferred fixed effects plus censoring specifications. The upper left quadrant with dashed lines
contains the cross-citations from the European Countries.
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Table 1: Time to first citation, by cited and citing inventor location
Period: 1975 - 1989
Citing:
DE FR GB EU JP US RW
Cited:
DE 1559 1623 1537 1702 1539 1770 1844
FR 1606 1555 1596 1676 1600 1727 1874
GB 1644 1649 1469 1705 1590 1738 1930
EU 1638 1643 1629 1690 1586 1784 1886
JP 1382 1423 1392 1464 1183 1443 1726
US 1637 1654 1615 1710 1528 1639 1855
RW 1728 1753 1755 1799 1711 1814 1795
Period: 1990 - 1999
Citing:
DE FR GB EU JP US RW
Cited:
DE 966 973 1037 1021 915 1016 1013
FR 1015 983 1004 994 918 1009 1000
GB 962 946 933 976 866 980 1000
EU 995 945 991 995 893 1002 972
JP 879 872 915 940 794 889 838
US 900 887 912 925 804 874 864
RW 965 926 945 937 814 931 834
Notes: The table shows the mean number of day from the date that a cited inventor was granted
a patent until the first citation of that patent, by the location of the inventor that made the first
citation. For example, the number in the top panel for the first French (FR) citation to a German
(DE) patents in the early period indicates that when the first citation to a Germany patent was
made by a French inventor this citation took on average 1623 days. The top and bottom panels show
the average time to first citation for the period of 1975 to 1989 and that of 1990 to 1999, respectively.
‘DE’ = Germany, ‘FR’ = France, ‘GB’ = Great Britain, ‘EU’ = remaining EU countries together,
‘JP’ = Japan, ‘US’ = United States and ‘RW’ = the rest of the world. In particular, ‘EU’ consists
of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain and Sweden.
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Table 2: Sample Sizes of Patent Citation Data
Technological Period Country of Cited Patents
Category DE FR GB EU JP US RW Total
Chemical All 47076 13834 14635 22083 73463 229342 28680 429113
Early 26876 7331 8924 11351 32499 129433 14878 231292
Late 20200 6503 5711 10732 40964 99909 13802 197821
Computers All 8556 6766 6347 7927 70874 133411 13154 247035
and Communications Early 4110 3158 2764 2940 19862 45020 2871 80725
Late 4446 3608 3583 4987 51012 88391 10283 166310
Drugs All 12707 7061 8027 10101 18261 114125 13047 183329
and Medical Early 5841 2764 3562 3427 6839 38390 4654 65477
Late 6866 4297 4465 6674 11422 75735 8393 117852
Electrical All 25841 12045 10719 14114 85771 192136 26118 366744
and Electronic Early 14293 6388 6524 7378 30796 96573 8267 170219
Late 11548 5657 4195 6736 54975 95563 17851 196525
Mechanical All 46432 14059 13951 24393 96980 239476 32132 467423
Early 26542 8253 9033 14078 42732 133172 15073 248883
Late 19890 5806 4918 10315 54248 106304 17059 218540
Others All 30229 11489 12300 21836 46424 283137 39542 444957
Early 17565 6528 7519 12277 21313 151271 17664 234137
Late 12664 4961 4781 9559 25111 131866 21878 210820
Total All 170841 65254 65979 100454 391773 1191627 152673 2138601
Early 95227 34422 38326 51451 154041 593859 63407 1030733
Late 75614 30832 27653 49003 237732 597768 89266 1107868
Notes: Data consist of patents that were granted between 1975 and 1999. The patents in the data
were all taken out at the United States Patent Office (USPTO). A country of cited patents refers
to the location of an applicant: ‘DE’ = Germany, ‘FR’ = France, ‘GB’ = Great Britain, ‘EU’ =
remaining EU countries together, ‘JP’ = Japan, ‘US’ = United States and ‘RW’ = the rest of the
world. In particular, ‘EU’ consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Period ‘All’ includes years from 1975 to
1999 in which cited patents are granted. ‘Early’ and ‘Late’ Periods correspond to 1975-1989 and
1990-1999, respectively.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Patent Citation Data
Variable Chemical Computers and Drugs and Electrical and Mechanical Others
Communications Medical Electronic
Proportion of patents 0.59 0.64 0.54 0.64 0.61 0.62
with two or more citations
Proportion of patents 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.15
with only one citation
Proportion of patents 0.26 0.25 0.33 0.23 0.24 0.23
with no citation
Proportion of self-citation 0.24 0.16 0.26 0.18 0.24 0.31
(first citation)
Proportion of self-citation 0.20 0.14 0.22 0.15 0.21 0.28
(second citation)
Proportion of same technology 0.65 0.71 0.76 0.67 0.69 0.70
class (first citation)
Proportion of same technology 0.63 0.71 0.76 0.66 0.68 0.69
class (second citation)
Average of Base 4.79 3.12 2.94 2.43 3.22 3.91
(first citation)
Average of Base 4.96 3.15 3.04 2.49 3.30 3.97
(second citation)
Notes: Data consist of patents that were granted between 1975 and 1999. The patents in the data
were all taken out at the United States Patent Office (USPTO). The base variable is defined as the
number of patents in the citing country and technology sub-category (1 unit = 10,000 patents).
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Table 4: Estimation Results
Technological Category: Mechanical
Country of Cited Patents: Great Britain (GB)
Sample Size: 13951; Obs. with at least two citations: 8482
(1) (2) (3)
Variable No Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect plus Censoring
DE -0.23 -0.17 -0.26
( 0.05 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.09 )
FR -0.21 -0.07 -0.20
( 0.07 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.12 )
EU -0.26 -0.07 -0.19
( 0.06 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.11 )
JP -0.13 -0.23 -0.30
( 0.05 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.09 )
US -0.31 -0.25 -0.35
( 0.05 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.09 )
RW -0.33 -0.24 -0.31
( 0.06 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.10 )
Self Cit. 0.30 0.31 0.27
( 0.04 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.08 )
Tech.Cat. 0.02 0.10 0.12
( 0.02 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 )
Base -0.07 0.06 0.04
( 0.06 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.12 )
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses. The dummy variables for the location of an applicant
of citing patent are ‘DE’ = Germany, ‘FR’ = France, ‘EU’ = remaining EU countries together, ‘JP’
= Japan, ‘US’ = United States and ‘RW’ = the rest of the world. In particular, ‘EU’ consists of
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain and Sweden. The omitted category in citing patent country dummies is Great Britain (GB).
The Self Citation and Technology Category variables are dummy variables. The Base variable is
the number of patents in citing country and subcategory (one unit = 100,000 patents). Different
columns show different estimates. Column (1) shows no-fixed-effect estimates using the only first
citation duration, Column (2) shows fixed-effect (FE) estimates using first two citation durations,
and Column (3) shows FE estimates accounting for censoring.
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Table 5: Estimation Results of Mechanical (FE + C)
Mechanical (FE + C) - Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Country of Country of Citing Patents
Cited Patents DE FR GB EU JP US RW
DE 0.02 0.15 -0.12 -0.09 -0.22 -0.07
( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.06 )
FR -0.18 -0.21 -0.23 -0.19 -0.32 -0.52
( 0.11 ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.12 )
GB -0.26 -0.20 -0.19 -0.30 -0.35 -0.31
( 0.09 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.10 )
EU -0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.05 -0.12 -0.12
( 0.07 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 )
JP 0.03 0.07 0.09 -0.16 -0.11 -0.31
( 0.03 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 )
US 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.00 -0.02 -0.11
( 0.02 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 )
RW -0.15 0.03 -0.10 -0.08 -0.15 -0.22
( 0.07 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.06 )
Notes: Each row contains parameter estimates and their standard errors (in parentheses) from a
separate multiple-spell duration model for each country. The censored fixed effect estimator (FE+C)
is used with the entire sample for a technology category called “Mechanical”. The country name in
the first column corresponds to the location of the patent’s inventor, which is subsequently cited.
The country names in columns (1) through (7) correspond to the inventor location of the patent
which subsequently cites the original patent. The left-out base country dummy is the cited patent’s
country. Country codes with corresponding country names are as follows: ‘DE’ = Germany, ‘FR’
= France, ‘GB’ = Great Britain, ‘EU’ = remaining EU countries together, ‘JP’ = Japan, ‘US’ =
United States and ‘RW’ = the rest of the world. In particular, ‘EU’ consists of Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
In addition to country dummies, each hazard regression includes, as explanatory variables, dummy
variables for self citation and technology sub-category and the number of patents in citing country
and subcategory.
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Table 6: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias using Entire Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Technological Max. # of No FE FE FE+C
Category rejections 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1%
Chemical 42 38 35 32 23 20 14 19 17 13
Computers 42 27 25 18 9 8 3 13 8 4
& Communications
Drugs 42 37 34 28 17 11 4 15 13 6
& Medical
Electrical 42 31 29 24 12 10 5 14 10 4
& Electronic
Mechanical 42 40 40 38 20 18 14 24 23 12
Others 42 40 40 40 28 23 22 26 23 18
Total 252 213 203 180 109 90 62 111 94 57
Percentage 0.85 0.81 0.71 0.43 0.36 0.25 0.44 0.37 0.23
Notes: The number of rejections of one-sided t-tests for individual coefficients is shown in each
cell of the table. Three levels of tests are considered: 1%, 5%, and 10 %. Also, three different
estimators are used: no-fixed-effect estimator (No FE) using only first citation duration, fixed-effect
(FE) estimator using first two spells, and censored fixed effect (FE+C) estimator.
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Table 7: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias using Sub-Samples
Estimation Method: No Fixed Effect Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Technological All countries OECD countries EU countries
Category Early Late Early Late Early Late
Chemical 33 9 21 6 8 0
Computers 23 10 14 7 3 1
and Communications
Drugs 28 12 19 8 9 4
and Medical
Electrical 25 16 16 8 4 2
and Electronic
Mechanical 31 23 22 14 8 4
Others 37 26 26 16 11 5
Total 177 96 118 59 43 16
Max. # of rejections 252 252 180 180 72 72
Percentage 0.70 0.38 0.66 0.33 0.60 0.22
Notes: The number of rejections of one-sided 5% t-tests for individual coefficients is shown in each
cell of the table for the early period (1975-1989) and for the late period (1990-1999) separately.
The columns under “All countries” show the number of rejections for all coefficients for country
dummies (42 coefficients), those under “OECD countries” show the number of rejections for country
dummy coefficients dropping the “Rest of the World” coefficients and also coefficients from “Rest
of the World” cited patent regressions (as a result, 30 coefficients), and those under “EU countries”
show the number of rejections for EU country dummy coefficients of EU cited patent regressions
(hence, further reduced to 12 coefficients). The test results are based on the no fixed effect (No FE)
estimator.
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Table 8: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias using Sub-Samples
Estimation Method: Censored Fixed Effect Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Technological All countries OECD countries EU countries
Category Early Late Early Late Early Late
Chemical 16 8 9 5 1 0
Computers 2 5 0 3 0 1
& Communications
Drugs 8 8 5 6 3 3
& Medical
Electrical 8 7 4 5 0 1
& Electronic
Mechanical 20 6 14 1 4 0
Others 20 11 13 5 3 0
Total 74 45 45 25 11 5
Max. # of rejections 252 252 180 180 72 72
Percentage 0.29 0.18 0.25 0.14 0.15 0.07
Notes: The number of rejections of one-sided 5% t-tests for individual coefficients is shown in each
cell of the table for the early period (1975-1989) and for the late period (1990-1999) separately. The
columns under “All countries” show the number of rejections for all coefficients for country dummies
(42 coefficients), those under “OECD countries” show the number of rejections for country dummy
coefficients dropping the “Rest of the World” coefficients and also coefficients from “Rest of the
World” cited patent regressions (as a result, 30 coefficients), and those under “EU countries” show
the number of rejections for EU country dummy coefficients of EU cited patent regressions (hence,
further reduced to 12 coefficients). The test results are based on the censored fixed effect (FE+C)
estimator.
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A Econometric Appendix
A.1 Likelihood Function with Censoring
The censoring time Ci for patent i is defined as the number of days from the date of patent i be-
ing granted to the common censoring date. We assume that the censoring time Ci is independent
(Y˜ij , Xij , Ui) and identically distributed with an unknown probability distribution. Furthermore, we
assume that the support of Ci is the whole real line. Under this censoring mechanism, our data consist
of {(Yij ,∆ij , Xij , Ci) : i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , J}, where Yij = min(Y˜ij , Ci) and ∆ij = 1(Y˜ij < Ci).
Here, 1(·) is the usual indicator function. Thus, we observe uncensored citation durations only when
∆ij = 1, that is citation durations are less than the censoring time.
In this paper, we propose a modified version of the conditional likelihood estimator to correct for
the selection bias. Specifically, the proposed estimator of β, say βˆ, maximizes the following weighted
conditional log-likelihood function with J = 2:
L (b) = n−1
n∑
i=1
∆i1∆i2
Gn (max [Yi1, Yi2])
{[
1 (Yi1 ≤ Yi2) ln
(
exp (X ′i1b)
exp (X ′i1b) + exp (X
′
i2b)
)]
+1 (Yi1 ≥ Yi2) ln
[
exp (X ′i2b)
exp (X ′i1b) + exp (X
′
i2b)
]}
, (A1)
where Gn(·) is an estimator of the survivor function G(·) of the censoring time Ci, in particular Gn(c) =
n−1
∑n
i=1 1(Ci > c). Our econometric framework is based on a continuous-time duration model, which
is suitable for our application since we have citation durations measured in days. However, it is possible
to have ties and they are included in both contributed terms in (A1). Observe that the selection
bias is corrected for by multiplying weights Gn(max{Yi1, Yi2})−1 in equation (A1). The reason why
Gn(max{Yi1, Yi2})−1’s are proper weights is that
E
[
∆i1∆i2
G(max{Yi1, Yi2})
∣∣∣Y˜i1, Y˜i2, Xi1, Xi2] = 1 (A2)
In other words, (A1) converges in probability uniformly over b to a limiting function to which an
infeasible log-likelihood function would converge under no censoring. In maximizing (A1), we trim
away 0.5% of observations with the smallest values of Gn(max[Yi1, Yi2]) to mitigate the leverage of
outliers.
A.2 Asymptotic Distribution of the Censored Fixed-Effect Estimator
This section of the appendix describes regularity conditions under which the censored fixed-effect es-
timator is consistent and asymptotically normal. Also, it gives the form of asymptotic variance of the
censored fixed-effect estimator.
Assumption A.1 (1) β is an interior point of a compact subset of Rd for some finite d. (2) The
data {(Yi1, Yi2, Xi1, Xi2,∆i1,∆i2, Ci) : i = 1, . . . , n} are independent and identically distributed. (3)
Y˜i1 and Y˜i2 are independent of each other conditional on (Xi1, Xi2, Ui). (4) λi(·) is strictly posi-
tive. (5) E
[
‖Xi1 −Xi2‖2
]
< ∞ and E[(Xi1 − Xi2)(Xi1 − Xi2)′] is nonsingular. (6) The censoring
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variable Ci is random with an unknown continuous probability distribution. (7) Ci is independent of
(Y˜i1, Y˜i2, Xi1, Xi2, Ui). (8) The survivor function of Ci, G(c) ≡ Pr(Ci > c) is positive for every c ∈ R.
These assumptions are not unrestrictive, but in our application, they might be viewed as plausible. It
is reasonable that the censoring time Ci is independent of potential citation durations Y˜ij , the attributes
of the citing patent Xij , and the heterogeneity term Ui, because the dates of patents being granted may
have little to do with underlying patent-citing processes.1 Also, the full support condition (8) on the
censoring time is not so restrictive in our application given that we follow patent citations over a long
period and we focus mainly on the first two citations.
Let
Hi(b) = 1(Yi1 ≤ Yi2)[Xi1 −Xi2] exp(X
′
i2b)
exp(X ′i1b) + exp(X
′
i2b)
+ 1(Yi1 ≥ Yi2)[Xi2 −Xi1] exp(X
′
i1b)
exp(X ′i1b) + exp(X
′
i2b)
.
(A3)
Define
Ω = Γ−1
{
Var
[
∆1∆2
G(max{Y1, Y2})H(β)
]
−Var [ρ(C)]
}
Γ−1,
where
Γ = E
[
−∂
2L(β)
∂b∂b′
]
and ρ(c) = E
[
∆1∆2H(β)
G2(max{Y1, Y2})1(c > max{Y1, Y2})
]
.
Then the following theorem gives the asymptotic normality of the censored fixed-effect estimator.
Theorem A.1 Let Assumption A.1 hold. Assume that Ω exists and is finite. Then as n→∞,
√
n(βˆ − β)→d N(0,Ω). (A4)
The proof of Theorem A.1 is omitted and it can be proved as in the proof of Theorem 1 of Lee
(2007). The asymptotic variance Ω can be consistently estimated by
Ωˆ = Γˆ−1
[
n−1
n∑
i=1
(Φˆi − ρˆi)(Φˆi − ρˆi)′
]
Γˆ−1,
1However, this restriction can be violated if there is a cohort effect on cited patents such as technology waves.
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where Gni = Gn(max{Yi1, Yi2}),
Γˆ = n−1
n∑
i=1
∆i1∆i2
Gni
[Xi1 −Xi2][Xi1 −Xi2]′ exp(X
′
i1βˆ +X
′
i2βˆ)[
exp(X ′i1βˆ) + exp(X
′
i2βˆ)
]2
Φˆi =
∆i1∆i2
Gni
Hi(βˆ),
and
ρˆi = n−1
n∑
k=1
[
∆1k∆2kHk(βˆ)
G2nk
1(Ci > max{Y1k, Y2k})
]
.
B Additional Data Description and Results
In this Appendix we include several tables showing additional results.
Table A1 shows a tabulation of the country of the first patent citing each of the cited patents in our
data. The diagonal elements show that there is substantial home bias in the raw data. A problem we
face in evaluating the time taken until the first patent is that not all patents have been cited. Estimating
on only those patents where observe two citations would lead to potential selection bias. Table A2 shows
the number of patents that are censored, by industry. Table A3 splits this down into the early and late
period, clearly showing that the censoring problem is much more significant in the later period. Table
A4 shows this by cited country. This motivates our use of estimators that explicitly allow for censoring.
In investigating the change in home bias over time we have chosen 1990 as a cutoff year because this
approximately balanced the number of citations in early and later years. In Table A5 and A6 we show
the robustness of the results to using the middle year of our sample period, 1985. As also discussed
in the main test, we focus on the first two citations for a patent. We can easily extend our method
using also the third citation and quasi-difference between the second and third citation and we show
the results from doing this in Table A7. Similarly we can use up to the fourth citation (see Table A8).
Our results are robust to using these alternative citations.
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Table A1: Raw data: home bias in first citation
Citing:
Cited: DE FR GB EU JP US RW
DE 29.45 2.99 2.79 4.94 13.48 40.58 5.78
FR 8.01 18.97 3.21 5.01 11.86 46.96 5.98
GB 7.78 3.11 16.12 4.48 11.44 51.13 5.93
EU 8.40 3.33 2.68 20.68 11.66 46.10 7.16
JP 5.32 1.76 1.59 2.73 48.85 34.69 5.05
US 4.42 1.93 2.06 2.84 9.18 74.12 5.45
RW 6.24 2.40 2.16 4.21 10.31 50.33 24.34
Notes: Data consists of all patents that were granted between 1975 and 1999 (the cited patent) and the
first patent to cite it (the citing patent). An element {i, j} in the Table shows the proportion of patents
granted to an inventor located in row-country i that are first cited by an inventor in a column country
j. For example, element {1, 2} indicates that 2.99% of patents from German inventors were first cited
by an inventor in France.
Table A2: Censoring - many patents have not (yet) been cited
Chemicals Computer Drugs Electrical Mechanical Other Total
obs 2 cites 254,301 157,335 99,137 233,766 285,073 276,058 1,305,670
(59.26) (63.69) (54.08) (63.74) (60.99) (62.04) (61.05)
obs 1 cite 62,495 27,764 23,346 48,917 70,421 64,587 297,530
(14.56) (11.24) (12.73) (13.34) (15.07) (14.52) (13.91)
obs no cites 112,317 61,936 60,846 84,061 111,929 104,313 535,402
(26.17) (25.07) (33.19) (22.92) (23.95) (23.44) (25.04)
Notes: Each row indicates the number of observations that had at least two cites (“obs 2 cites”), one
cite (“obs 1 cite”) or no cites (“obs no cite”). The number in parentheses indicates the proportion of
observations by industry that had different numbers of cites. For example, our dataset contains 254,301
cites to patents in the chemicals technology sector that had at least two cites.
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Table A3: Censoring - by early and late time period
1975-1989 Chemicals Computer Drugs Electrical Mechanical Other Total
obs 2 cites 174,400 71,908 51,620 141,139 191,879 186,218 817,164
75.40 89.08 78.84 82.92 77.10 79.53 79.28
obs 1 cite 28,783 5,236 6,752 16,970 31,659 27,330 116,730
12.44 6.49 10.31 9.97 12.72 11.67 11.32
obs no cites 28,109 3,581 7,105 12,110 25,345 20,589 96,839
12.15 4.44 10.85 7.11 10.18 8.79 9.40
1990-1999
obs 2 cites 79,901 85,427 47,517 92,627 93,194 89,840 488,506
40.39 51.37 40.32 47.13 42.64 42.61 44.09
obs 1 cite 33,712 22,528 16,594 31,947 38,762 37,257 180,800
17.04 13.55 14.08 16.26 17.74 17.67 16.32
obs no cites 84,208 58,355 53,741 71,951 86,584 83,724 438,563
42.57 35.09 45.60 36.61 39.62 39.71 39.59
Notes: This is the same as Table A2 except we now split into early and later years.
Table A4: Censoring - by cited country
cited country: DE FR GB EU JP US RW Total
obs 2 cites 98,036 36,947 39,723 54,427 237,390 762,727 76,420 1,305,670
57.74 56.83 61.06 54.84 60.77 63.57 51.29 61.05
obs 1 cite 26,964 10,294 9,471 15,856 53,744 157,326 23,875 297,530
15.88 15.83 14.56 15.98 13.76 13.11 16.02 13.91
obs no cites 44,800 17,769 15,857 28,961 99,487 279,815 48,713 535,402
26.38 27.33 24.38 29.18 25.47 23.32 32.69 25.04
Notes: This is the same as Table A2 except we now split country. DE: Germany, FR: France, GB:
Great Britain, EU: other European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden), JP: Japan, US: United States, RW: Rest of
World.
44
Table A5: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias using Sub-Samples
Estimation Method: No Fixed Effect Estimator
Cutoff Year: 1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Technological All countries OECD countries EU countries
Category Early Late Early Late Early Late
Chemical 33 25 21 16 8 6
Computers 18 15 10 10 2 1
and Communications
Drugs 24 20 17 11 7 4
and Medical
Electrical 22 21 14 11 3 0
and Electronic
Mechanical 28 32 20 20 6 9
Others 32 35 22 23 9 9
Total 157 148 104 91 35 29
Max. # of rejections 252 252 180 180 72 72
Percentage 0.62 0.58 0.58 0.51 0.49 0.40
Notes: The number of rejections of one-sided 5% t-tests for individual coefficients is shown in each
cell of the table for the early period (1975-1984) and for the late period (1985-1999) separately. Note
that the tables in the main text use 1990 as the cut-off year. The columns under “All countries” show
the number of rejections for all coefficients for country dummies (42 coefficients), those under “OECD
countries” show the number of rejections for country dummy coefficients dropping the “Rest of the
World” coefficients and also coefficients from “Rest of the World” cited patent regressions (as a result,
30 coefficients), and those under “EU countries” show the number of rejections for EU country dummy
coefficients of EU cited patent regressions (hence, further reduced to 12 coefficients). The test results
are based on the no fixed effect (No FE) estimator.
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Table A6: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias using Sub-Samples
Estimation Method: Censored Fixed Effect Estimator
Cutoff Year: 1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Technological All countries OECD countries EU countries
Category Early Late Early Late Early Late
Chemical 21 10 13 5 2 1
Computers 6 6 4 4 3 1
& Communications
Drugs 7 11 4 7 1 3
& Medical
Electrical 5 9 4 4 0 1
& Electronic
Mechanical 16 9 11 4 3 0
Others 21 16 13 9 3 2
Total 76 61 49 33 12 8
Max. # of rejections 252 252 180 180 72 72
Percentage 0.30 0.24 0.27 0.18 0.17 0.11
Notes: The number of rejections of one-sided 5% t-tests for individual coefficients is shown in each
cell of the table for the early period (1975-1984) and for the late period (1985-1999) separately. Note
that the tables in the main text use 1990 as the cut-off year. The columns under “All countries” show
the number of rejections for all coefficients for country dummies (42 coefficients), those under “OECD
countries” show the number of rejections for country dummy coefficients dropping the “Rest of the
World” coefficients and also coefficients from “Rest of the World” cited patent regressions (as a result,
30 coefficients), and those under “EU countries” show the number of rejections for EU country dummy
coefficients of EU cited patent regressions (hence, further reduced to 12 coefficients). The test results
are based on the censored fixed effect (FE+C) estimator.
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Table A7: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias using Entire Sample with Second and Third Citation
Spells
Technological Maximum number No FE FE FE+C
Category of rejections 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1 %
Chemical 42 38 33 29 20 16 7 18 15 7
Computers 42 33 26 19 10 7 6 11 8 4
& Communications
Drugs 42 36 34 25 19 12 4 20 15 8
& Medical
Electrical 42 34 33 26 13 11 5 16 14 8
& Electronic
Mechanical 42 40 39 34 25 22 18 24 19 14
Others 42 41 37 37 20 15 8 20 16 10
Total 252 222 202 170 107 83 48 109 87 51
Notes: This is equivalent of Table 6 in the main text except we use estimates based on the second and
third citation (instead of the first and second citation).
Table A8: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias using Entire Sample with Third and Fourth Citation
Spells
Technological Maximum number No FE FE FE+C
Category of rejections 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1 %
Chemical 42 37 35 34 12 10 5 12 5 3
Computers 42 33 29 21 8 5 1 7 4 1
& Communications
Drugs 42 37 28 19 10 7 2 5 4 0
& Medical
Electrical 42 29 28 25 17 10 3 14 8 6
& Electronic
Mechanical 42 35 34 30 14 12 6 14 10 5
Others 42 39 38 35 19 15 6 13 11 1
Total 252 210 192 164 80 59 23 65 42 16
Notes: This is equivalent of Table 6 in the main text except we use estimates based on the third and
fourth citation (instead of the first and second citation).
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